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IntroductIon
Most people date Sudan’s Islamist turn to 1983, when the decaying government 
of Jaafar Nimeiri began a controversial experiment with Islamic sharīca law, 
or to the Islamists’ National Salvation Revolution, led by Omar al-Bashir in 
1989. But for Hasan al-Turabi, the leader of Sudan’s Islamist movement for 
most of its twentieth century existence, Sudan’s Islamist turn, and its first 
modern experiment in Islamic legislation, began a few years earlier, in August 
1977. In a speech in the Mecca Club, he explained what had happened to an 
appreciative Saudi audience:
“Not many people know that the first 
Islamic legislation promulgated in 
Sudan was the [one] which set up an 
Islamic bank which bore the name of 
a man who was a herald of Islam and 
a herald of Islamic solidarity, the late 
King Faisal [of Saudi Arabia], may 
God bless his memory. This bank 
was based on a law laid down by the 
Sudanese parliament which gave the 
bank immunities from tax laws … It 
was begun by people who believe in 
the Unseen. They were sure that the 
laws of God [prohibiting] interest, 
were inescapable, but they had no 
successful role models [to implement] them … people thought it was farfetched 
that wealth could be aggregated and allocated to investment, except in a 
western way. After a year or two, the fruits of this experiment were visible 
to people … sharīca practically demonstrated its truth, and fears and doubts 
subsided. Because of this real example, people were confident that other areas 
of civil life and constitutional life could work the same.”1 
“The Faisal Islamic 
Bank of Sudan, set 
up by the 1977 law, 
marked a decisive twist 
in Sudan’s entangled 
histories of economics 
and religion...”
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The Faisal Islamic Bank of 
Sudan, set up by the 1977 law, 
marked a decisive twist in 
Sudan’s entangled histories of 
economics and religion. From 
the late 1970s Sudan’s Islamic 
banks formed the economic 
basis of the Islamist movement. 
The movement used the 
economic power that these 
banks bestowed to consolidate 
an alliance between Islamists, 
financiers and security men, 
which emerged in the 1970s 
and took power in the National 
Salvation Revolution of 1989. 
The banks helped this alliance 
to build a new constituency of urban merchants who had hitherto had little 
access to capital, and to establish a commanding position in finance, managing 
remittances for Sudanese migrant workers in the Arabian peninsula, and the 
import-export trade in consumer goods – just as a new global economy based 
on labour migration, finance capital and international trade was coming into 
fashion. Turabi’s movement used the language of sharīca to align the interests 
of new social forces with new global economic trends. The invisible hand 
backed the Islamists.
This paper uses the changes that began with the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan 
to reflect on the ways that growth and inequality have been repatterned in 
Sudan over the last forty years. The alliance of Islamists, financiers and security 
men which the bank helped to create was exceptionally durable because it 
succeeded in harnessing global forces to Islamic values and using them to 
transform Sudan from an agricultural economy to one based on growing oil 
rents and growing services. These transitions were not painless – changing 
patterns of growth led to changing patterns of inequality. I will try to draw 
together some of these themes – Islamism, economic transformation, growth 
and inequality – without drifting off into abstraction, or vexing the reader 
with too much detail.
Three contentious terms: Islamism, sharīca, and neoliberalism
Before starting, I would like to discuss three contentious terms which are 
relevant for this paper, and which were invented or came to new prominence 
in the period under discussion. The first term is Islamism, which was a 
“These transitions 
were not painless 
– changing patterns 
of growth led to 
changing patterns 
of inequality...”
twentieth-century project to extend 
the scope of Islamic principles, laws 
and values in the social and economic 
life of Muslim societies. Turabi, 
who often preferred the phrase ‘the 
Islamist Awakening,’ (al-sahwa al-
islāmīya) presents Islamism as part 
of a historical cycle wherein Muslim 
apathy is periodically shocked into 
awareness by crisis; and presents the 
contemporary Islamist project as a 
response to Muslim experiences of 
colonialism.2 
The Islamist response to colonialism 
developed slowly. Many Islamist 
movements – including Sudan’s – 
were too marginal to play a major 
role in the path to independence, 
which was in the most part led by 
beneficiaries of the colonial order. 
They may have used Islamic symbols 
as a source of legitimacy but their 
political objectives were oriented 
towards the nation state, which 
aimed at a socialist or capitalist 
route to development, not some 
still-undefined ‘Islamic economy’ 
or ‘Islamic society.’ But the global 
financial crisis of the 1970s and 1980s 
revealed the limitations of a state built 
on borrowed models of development, 
and the need for development plans 
to reflect their cultural setting.3 This 
was the moment when a political 
project based on Islamic values began 
to look attractive. 
Islamist movements emerged in 
many different nation states, and 
often lacked the tools to generate 
a coherent alternative to the crisis 
and stagnation they encountered. 
But Islamism provided a political 
repertoire which different groups 
with divergent aims could exploit. 
In places like Turkey, Iran and 
Egypt, Islamism provided a critique 
of secularism and status quos. In 
Lebanon and Palestine, it provided a 
framework for resistance to foreign 
occupation. In the Arabian Gulf, 
it provided palace propaganda. In 
Sudan, the Islamist alliance with 
financial and commercial interests 
and security men built a constituency 
on the aspirations of urban 
shopkeepers, Darfurian students, 
female professionals, cadet branches 
of big families living disappointed 
provincial lives: people who lived on 
the fringes of Sudan’s bureaucratic, 
military and commercial elites, and 
who had the presence of mind to back 
a new order when the old elites were 
stumbling. 
Sharīca is a key term in Islamist politics, 
and it is the second contentious 
term addressed here. It is sometimes 
defined as the rules governing the 
lives of Muslims, derived principally 
from two canonical sources: the 
Qur’an and the hadith (a vast and 
contested literature describing the 
Prophet’s sunna, which is all that 
he said, did and tacitly approved). 
Over the course of the first Muslim 
empires, legal experts used these 
sources to create a flexible legal 
system addressing everything from 
commercial law, administrative law, 
criminal law and the laws of war. 
Sharīca rules on etiquette, hygiene, 
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personal status and liturgy deeply permeated Muslim cultures. At the fringes 
of Muslim empires, in places like Sudan, sharīca discourse was caught up in 
systems of warfare and commerce, and in the process sharīca served as a vector 
of modernity. 
Before and during Sudan’s colonial encounter, sharīca commercial law and 
sharīca inheritance law had provided the momentum for revolutionary changes 
to social relations and property rights. But ultimately, colonialism marked 
the end of sharīca’s sway over society – in Sudan and in most other Muslim 
societies. The colonial state dismantled sharīca institutions and relegated 
sharīca rules to the fringes of law and politics. In the process, Islamists began 
to use the term sharīca in a new, allusive way, disconnected from the precision 
of the imperial lawyers and theologians of the classical age of Islam, to refer 
to an ideal Muslim society.4 During the crises of the 1970s and 1980s, many 
Islamists saw in sharīca the promise of an alternative order. 
For the authoritarians with day-to-day responsibility for managing these 
crises, sharīca criminal penalties offered a radical form of social discipline at 
a polarized moment – and indeed, many Sudanese and others identify sharīca 
with its harshest criminal penalties, which in the early 1980s were meted out to 
its poorest citizens. But sharīca addresses a wider range of economic concerns, 
such as social justice, commerce and finance. In the 1950s and 1960s, many 
Islamists flirted with the idea of ‘Islamic socialism.’ They framed debates about 
the redistribution of wealth and social justice around the sharīca obligation of 
zakāt – a Qur’an-mandated alms tax on grain, livestock, gold, or other specified 
categories of wealth. The crisis of the 1970s prompted a reconsideration 
of the possibilities of sharīca commercial law in reframing systems for the 
production of wealth. An emerging discipline of ‘Islamic economics’ sought 
to use the sharīca prohibition on ribā, or interest, as the starting point for the 
development of Islamic banks, which replaced interest-bearing loans with 
different contracts for sharing risks, profits and losses between investors and 
entrepreneurs.5 In Sudan, Islamic banks decisively reshaped financial flows 
and social forces at a critical juncture, and they played a key role in changing 
patterns of growth and inequality.
The third contentious term is ‘neoliberalism,’ which this paper uses to describe 
some of the major processes by which the crisis of the 1970s worked its way 
across the world over subsequent decades. A US currency crisis and an oil 
shock created a combination of price inflation, stagnant growth and labour 
unrest, all of which led to declines in profits and productivity growth. In 
response to these interlinked crises, production processes were globalized and 
trade and financial flows were transformed, and governments lost economic 
growth and inequality that emerged 
from the end of the developmental 
state in Africa.11 In the 1970s, 
the Sudanese state implemented 
national development strategies 
which aimed at orienting Sudanese 
society towards a version of 
economic development that 
was broadly aimed at creating 
a more inclusive country. This 
‘developmental state’ fell apart in 
the 1980s, when it was replaced 
by a state led by the Islamists, 
which used the techniques of 
austerity and privatization instead 
of the ideology of development to 
manage Sudanese society. Price 
controls on basic commodities 
were abandoned, and new security 
forces managed the resulting 
urban protests. Publicly owned 
productive assets and services were 
sold politically well-connected 
groups.12 
In Sudan, privatization meant 
more than rent: as the state 
shifted its shape and social 
conflicts intensified, it started 
wars and then privatized military 
services, and militias aligned to 
governments, rebellions, and 
commercial interests reshaped war 
and economic life. Post-colonial 
progress on life expectancy was 
reversed.13 Universal entitlements 
to social services were abandoned 
in the name of debt-reduction, 
and instead, austerity economists 
linked entitlement to the now-
ubiquitous term ‘vulnerability.’ 
Debts, droughts and wars pushed 
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“Nonetheless, 
‘neoliberalism’ is 
a tempting term 
to use for any 
periodization of 
changing patterns 
of growth and 
inequality that 
emerged from 
the end of the 
developmental state 
in Africa...”
authority. These changes eventually 
were organized around an ensemble 
of policies that three economists 
from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) recently described as:
“the neoliberal agenda [which] rests 
on two main planks. The first is 
increased competition—achieved 
through deregulation and the 
opening up of domestic markets, 
including financial markets, to 
foreign competition. The second is 
a smaller role for the state, achieved 
through privatization and limits on 
the ability of governments to run 
fiscal deficits and accumulate debt.”6 
In their paper, the IMF economists 
argue that neoliberal policies 
transferred financial resources 
and technological knowhow across 
borders, creating growth and reducing 
the numbers of people in poverty. 
But they acknowledge that some 
neoliberal policies have increased 
inequality, and that they have not 
necessarily increased growth. The 
authors acknowledge that the word 
neoliberalism is more likely to be used 
by critics than by architects of these 
policies – it became a flame-word for 
activists in the 1990s, who disputed 
IMF claims that neoliberalism 
enhances growth or reduces poverty.7 
One sustained critique came from 
post-structuralism, which presented 
neoliberalism as an attempt to 
reorganize society around ideals of 
enterprise and performance – and to 
convince people that performance 
‘rankings’ reflect real rather than 
ideological differences.8 Another 
critique came from Marxism, which 
presented neoliberalism as an 
authoritarian alliance between the 
state and corporate power. This 
alliance – to continue with the 
language of this critique – was key 
to the neoliberal attempt to restore 
pre-crisis rates of profit, using 
strategies such as the privatization 
of social assets and the relocation 
of manufacturing production from 
the industrialized economies to low-
wage economies in East Asia.9 
‘Neoliberalism’ is a problematic 
term, not so much because it offends 
sensibilities of neoliberals who see 
its competitive order as the State of 
Nature, but because the historical 
forces that it describes played out 
so differently in different parts of 
the world. In Durham or Detroit, 
neoliberal policies defeated organized 
labour, and turned factory workers 
and miners into white van men, or 
cappuccino waitresses (the system 
reworked gender differences). In 
Guangxhou, the new system pushed 
farmers into factories. In London and 
New York, the system packaged debt 
into housing bubbles, which were 
inflated by a vast corps of real estate 
agents and the ‘confidence fairies’ 
of the bond markets.10 Using a single 
term to draw together this prodigious 
variety of experiences and processes 
risks a sacrifice of analytical clarity. 
Nonetheless, ‘neoliberalism’ is 
a tempting term to use for any 
periodization of changing patterns of 
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labour. The colonial regime set up an 
official sharīca system, with a mufti 
and sharīca judges and courts.19 These 
courts extended the influence of 
sharīca inheritance law, transforming 
landed property; and the state and 
social actors used a version of the 
sharīca law of war to legitimize the 
reorganization of production around 
slavery. 
Sharīca inheritance law was an 
adaptation of the patrilineal 
marriage and inheritance laws of the 
cities of the ancient near east. From 
the earliest days of Islam these laws 
kept inheritance primarily within 
the immediate family, not diffused 
through wider kinship structures.20 
Sharīca inheritance law revolutionized 
Arabian tribal society at the eve of 
the first Muslim empire.21 During 
the Turkiya, sharīca inheritance laws 
individuated property and broke 
the power of kin-based agricultural 
systems along the rich Nile banks. 
Heavy Turkish taxes then pushed 
farmers to mortgage and eventually 
sell off their lands, creating new 
markets in land in the process. Many 
of the farmers displaced by the 
commodification of the Nile’s fertile 
banks joined the ivory and slave trade 
that was spreading across the south – 
and many of the people they enslaved 
were used for agricultural labour on 
the recently-commodified lands that 
the farmers-turned-slavers had left.
Many state and social actors drew 
on the sharīca laws of war to justify 
the slave system. The sharīca laws 
of war permit the enslavement of 
captives taken in a jihād (a war to 
expand or defend Islam).22 Even 
Christian slave-raiders flew banners 
with exhortations to jihād from their 
fortified camps.23 This use of sharīca 
was self-serving: contemporary 
observers argued that the slave raids 
did not meet the definition of jihād.24 
But as in the days of the Funj, sharīca 
played a flexible role in helping 
global forces transform Sudan. From 
the 1840s, the Ottoman free trade 
agreements with European powers 
opened the Sudanese slave trade to 
what would now be called foreign 
direct investment, and it boomed.25 
Sharīca laws of war provided an 
explanatory framework for the cruel 
changes being wrought in the south. 
The Turkiya regime used an official 
Ottoman version of sharīca law 
to organize the new patterns of 
accumulation and inequality of a 
colonial state. In the course of the 
nineteenth century, however, the 
Ottoman empire began to modify its 
legal system. It developed secular 
commercial laws, shaped by western 
legal traditions, and restricted 
sharīca law to special domains, 
such as personal status. In Egypt – 
Sudan’s colonial metropole – sharīca 
commercial law had been in retreat 
since the establishment of commercial 
courts under the French occupation 
of 1798. By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the commercial 
law used in Egyptian courts was 
largely based the French commercial 
code.26 In Turkiya Sudan, sharīca 
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rural people into displacement, and as the state withdrew social supports, 
people were pushed towards new collectivities that might help insure 
themselves against crises, often improvised out of existing kinship structures 
or ethno-linguistic groups – leading to a new kind of tribalism.14 Internationally 
finance colonized lands for commercial agriculture. Land colonization was 
configured around war zones, displacing pastoralists and pushing young 
male pastoralists towards militias.15 The remnants of subsistence systems of 
agriculture were replaced by hungrier and more chaotic livelihoods strategies 
that linked rural people to towns and enclaves of development.16 
This paper does not set out to address controversies about neoliberalism. 
Instead, it seeks to set them in a particular historical context: Sudan, 1977-
2017. It sets out some of the complex and unexpected links between Sudan’s 
neoliberal transformation and the Islamist National Salvation Revolution, and 
its experiments with sharīca law. These linked historical changes modernized 
and polarized Sudan and re-patterned growth and inequality.
THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF SHARĪCA IN SUDAN TO 1977
Sharīca operated as a modernizing and polarizing force in Sudanese history 
ever since it became part of the political scene, around the sixteenth century, 
during the Funj sultanate. The sultanate used Islamic symbolism as part of its 
claims to legitimacy, and Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir recently described 
the sultanate as Sudan’s first Islamic state.17 Funj nobles were given estates, 
and the surplus produced from noble estates was traded internationally. 
Sultans tried to monopolize trade, but had to cede some power to merchants. 
Many of the merchants came from the Muslim cities of the Hijaz and the 
Mediterranean. Some had religious training, and they introduced sharīca 
commercial law to regulate contracts and their relationship with the state. 
Sultans rewarded their economic success with land grants and exemptions 
from the feudal dues. The estates of these merchants became sanctuaries 
for dissidents and dispossessed groups, and the tax-exempt merchants taxed 
their followers – not feudal dues, but zakāt and other taxes found in sharīca 
law. Zakāt helped the merchant-divines to accumulate wealth, and sharīca 
commercial law favoured them against the royal monopoly. It harnessed the 
forces of commercialization to benefit the merchant-divines, and pushed the 
feudal system towards disintegration.18 
In 1820, the Ottoman-Egyptian conquerors swept away the disintegrating 
Funj sultanate and set up the Turkiya, as their colonial state was known. The 
revolutionary force of sharīca law maintained its momentum. But this time, 
instead of empowering merchant-divines against a ‘feudal’ state, sharīca law 
worked to consolidate a colonial state, by reworking systems of land and 
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helped to create. When they finally came to power, they attempted to Islamize 
the economy. They reversed the trend towards integration in international 
markets, putting political conditions on merchants, and sometimes forbidding 
trade with Egypt.29 They based their tax systems on sharīca rules for zakāt and 
booty, and made zakāt into a state-managed system for finance social services. 
Their zakāt system was unable to cope with the famines of 1889-91, and they 
could not extract enough taxes to finance the costs of their administration 
and their military.30 
Turkiya and Mahdist versions of sharīca helped create the conflicted 
behemoth that was twentieth century Sudan, and at the same time delineated 
its social and economic fault-lines, and set many of the patterns of growth 
and inequality that are being reproduced today. In the twentieth century, the 
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, Sudan’s British-dominated second colonial 
regime, entrenched these fault-lines between the centre and the periphery, 
and maintained the spatial patterns of growth and inequality that had been set 
during the first colonial regime. At the centre, where land and labour relations 
had been transformed during the Turkiya, the condominium built a system of 
big estates that were part of a globally networked, export-oriented cotton and 
grain agricultural economy.31 
At the centre, the colonial government created a proletariat to serve the needs 
of the global economy. But a system of pass-laws and closed districts limited 
entry into that proletariat for the peoples of the periphery. Across most 
Sudanese territory – Darfur, the southern provinces, the Nuba Mountains, the 
southern Blue Nile, and parts of eastern and northern Sudan – colonial law 
restricted the movement of people and goods, and colonial budgets restricted 
the development of services and infrastructure. Some closed districts, like 
Darfur, functioned where necessary as a labour reserve for the agricultural 
estates. But people in the southern provinces were largely excluded from 
the new labour markets around the big estates. For a range of economic and 
political reasons, the condominium government deepened the nineteenth 
century fault-line between the north and south. In 1958, average incomes in 
the south were a third of those at the centre.32 
The condominium relegated sharīca to the margins of political and economic 
development, and accommodated in their economic system the Mahdist 
and other Muslim leaders who had developed huge constituencies over the 
nineteenth century. The condominium gave them huge estates: Abd al-Rahman 
al-Mahdi, the Mahdi’s posthumous son, was a principal beneficiary of huge 
land grants. But the production and distribution of wealth was secularized, 
financed by international banks and lending at interest to economic entities. 
inheritance law and a self-serving 
version of the laws on enslavement 
were used to revolutionary effect, 
but sharīca commercial law did not 
govern contracts. The privatized 
slave raids were financed by 
loans, at exorbitant rates of 
interest, provided by Khartoum’s 
cosmopolitan venture capitalists.27 
The Turkiya, and the global forces 
mustered behind it, invented the 
Sudan of the twentieth century. 
At its centre lay a zone organized 
around a contested version of 
sharīca law that forced people off 
the land to suit the interests of the 
state. At its periphery, it created a 
slaving zone from which recruits for 
slave armies and slave agriculture 
could be drawn. In Sudan, sharīca 
commercial law was in retreat but 
the sharīca law of inheritance and 
warfare was still at the forefront of 
change. 
The gradual relegation of sharīca 
from economic life did not diminish 
its political resonance. Sharīca still 
scripted resistance: the Mahdist 
revolution, which challenged and 
defeated the Turkiya in the 1880s, 
centred its propaganda on the 
illegitimacy of the Turkiya poll tax 
on Muslims.28 The revolutionaries 
raised their support from the 
peripheries that had been created 
out of Turkiya wars, raising their 
revolt in Sudan’s zones of predation 
and conquering the central zone 
of accumulation – zones which 
the Turkiya version of sharīca had 
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In 1970, with Soviet support, the 
new government nationalized 
Sudan’s financial systems to mobilize 
domestic resources to finance its 
new development plans. Until then, 
Sudan’s banks had all been foreign-
owned, and wedded to quick-returns 
lending that allocated capital at 
Sudan’s centre. Within a couple of 
years, however, the government 
switched Cold War sides and found 
a source of easier money – the huge 
financial surpluses garnered by Arab 
oil-exporting countries after the 1973 
oil price shock. Arab states needed 
to invest that money, and huge 
quantities of their petrodollars were 
recycled through international banks 
into national development plans 
like Sudan’s. Growth rates soared: 
between 1973 and 1977, GDP growth 
rates averaged 10.1 percent annually 
(still the highest rates on record).37 
But a financial storm approached.
THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM
In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, sharīca had been a 
contested, shifting, flexible, 
modernizing idiom for capital in 
Sudan, attuned to global economic 
change, and mediating the changes 
required by the encroachment of 
global forces of finance and trade. 
But for most of the twentieth century 
sharīca laws regulating the production 
and redistribution of wealth were 
relegated to the margins. However, 
the flow of petrodollars from the 
Gulf reoriented Sudan’s path to 
development, and the future of 
Islamist politics in Sudan. Sudanese 
politicians once again began to use 
sharīca to interpret and implement 
changes that were driven by external 
economic forces. 
There were two main changes. First, 
some of the petrodollars helped 
to develop a new Islamic model 
for Sudan’s future development, 
based on zakāt and on a new 
Islamic financial system. The new 
Islamic economy created from these 
petrodollars became a constituency 
for the Islamist movement, built 
around a service economy that by the 
beginning of the twenty-first century 
eclipsed the agricultural economy. 
Second, a much larger volume of 
petrodollars was loaned out at 
interest to finance Sudan’s national 
development projects. These projects 
were largely unsuccessful, and the 
cash became a debt mountain, which 
eventually restructured the entire 
national economy. The Islamists 
used the authoritarian potential of 
sharīca discourse to force through the 
restructuring of the economy. These 
two changes repatterned growth and 
inequality in Sudan. 
To begin with the new Islamic 
economic system: the exponents 
of the emerging field of Islamic 
economics could solve the problems 
of the production and distribution of 
wealth within an Islamic social order. 
Zakāt would redistribute wealth 
from economic winners to economic 
losers. And sharīca commercial law 
could provide modern-day financial 
contracts based on a sharing-
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The zakāt system became a private matter once again, managed by religious 
patriarchs. Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi had a network of agents who collected 
zakāt from his followers across Sudan, which was administered by his 
Commercial Company, set up to manage his estates.33 
In the two decades after Sudan’s independence in 1956, sharīca mostly remained 
at the margins. Independent Sudan was led by the bureaucratic and commercial 
beneficiaries of the colonial order, who organized electoral politics around the 
religious constituencies that had been built up and maintained by religious 
dynasts such as Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi. The struggle between the leadership 
and other social actors over the country’s path to development intensified – 
the left called for structural change, marginalized groups in the west called for 
more even development, and southern leaders were drawn into a war for self-
determination. Sudan was, to use Peter Woodward’s phrase, an ‘unstable state,’ 
and experiments with new ideological and institutional forms were risky.34 
These risks were soon revealed. In 1969, Jaafar Nimeri led a new, secular 
government to power, promising fundamental change. The government 
signed a peace agreement in 1972 that ended the civil war in the south and 
sought to reorient development away from the centre to Sudan’s periphery, 
with its war and poverty, its rich soils, water resources and huge populations. 
The government’s plans aimed at expanding irrigated and mechanized 
agriculture, by reorganizing land tenure and providing agricultural credit for 
large enterprises – but the plans generally neglected the traditional sector, 
which employed an estimated 75 percent of the population.35 The new 
government also sought to expand infrastructure development and to replace 
the light administrative structure of the colonial state with a bureaucratic 
apparatus for the provision of services.36 
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which new Instant Justice courts dispensed. The laws were dreamed up in 
a panicked presidential palace, as the country was subsumed under a debt 
mountain. 
In the early 1980s, Sudan began a long, cruel and total economic restructuring 
prompted by its international creditors. The abolition of interest-based banking 
was a domestic affair: Sudan still had to pay off its debts at interest. The Saudi 
government, one of Sudan’s principal creditors, insisted on full compliance 
with the IMF, which was now managing Saudi loans.42 The Islamist movement 
learned some complicated lessons: interest-bearing loans crushed Sudan with 
debt, harsh new laws phrased in the language of legal Islam helped to give 
the government some of the authoritarian heft it needed to push through its 
programme of economic restructuring, and Islamic banks concentrated power 
and wealth in the hands of a new political constituency.
For the Islamists, sharīca worked. Sharīca-compliant banking allowed the 
Islamist movement to mobilize an economic base. It also aligned Sudan with 
global forces of change that were disrupting patterns of growth and inequality 
across the world. Islam like all religions has authoritarian potential, and 
the authoritarian potential of sharīca discourse could be deployed to justify 
the need for the economic changes which favoured many in the Islamist 
movement. This discourse could explain and justify the new patterns of growth 
in Sudan – based around urban commerce and services – and the new patterns 
of inequality, in the chaotic famine and drought zones of the southern and 
western periphery, and the squatter zones of the towns where the peoples of 
the periphery underwent a traumatic urbanization. 
Austerity and changing patterns of growth
The Islamists seized power in 1989, after a 1985 popular uprising which got rid 
of Nimeiri and a parliamentary interlude when Sudan’s debt crisis deepened. 
The National Salvation Revolution, as the Islamists called the new regime, 
moved quickly to introduce new sharīca elements into the penal code and the 
banking laws (Nimeiri’s version of sharīca had been suspended during the 
parliamentary regime, which never mustered the authority to repeal his laws).
The new government was not popular. It believed the solution for the 
debts, droughts and wars that beset Sudan’s diverse societies was a unified 
Islamist identity, and it declared jihād against Muslims and non-Muslims 
who disagreed. Its security forces dragged people out of Khartoum salons 
and into their torture centres. It sided with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, against 
its Saudi and Kuwaiti creditors. It brought Osama bin Laden to Khartoum. But 
it was committed to a total restructuring of the Sudanese economy to pay 
out of risks, profits and losses, 
in a way that could make Islamic 
investors, entrepreneurs and workers 
outperform the capitalist alternatives 
on offer. 
Turabi’s speech in Mecca, quoted in 
the introduction to this paper, argued 
that the 1977 Islamic banking law 
marked the start of the Islamist turn 
in Sudan. Nimeiri took power with the 
help of a short-lived alliance with the 
left, and consolidated power with his 
alliance in the south, buttressed by 
debt-financed national development 
plans. But by 1977, a combination of 
maladministration and instability 
in ecologically vulnerable areas 
of northern Sudan pushed him to 
reshuffle his internal alliances: Turabi 
became Nimeiri’s most enthusiastic 
new ally and (in 1979) his minister of 
justice. 
Six years later, in 1983, the Nimeiri 
government brought in a version of 
sharīca law. The 1983 laws addressed 
banking and commerce (and a 1984 
law attempted to replace most taxes 
with zakāt).38 The Faisal Islamic Bank 
of Sudan Act of 1977 had permitted 
interest-free banking, and given the 
new bank privileges which helped 
it to garner foreign investment. The 
1983 laws, in contrast, prohibited 
all interest-based banking. This 
made life impossible for Sudan’s 
commercial banks and empowered 
the new Islamic banks – which 
proliferated as a result of the success 
of the Faisal Islamic Bank. 
The Islamic banks offered access to 
capital through a range of interest-
free financial instruments to people 
who never had access to capital 
before. Minibus drivers bought their 
own vehicles. Shopkeepers imported 
goods. Grain merchants allegedly 
bought grain supplies on credit and 
hoarded them as famine boosted their 
prices.39 Financiers made enormous 
profits, and new urban service 
industries eclipsed agriculture.40 All 
these new winners supported the 
Islamists.
But these Islamist advances took 
place against a backdrop of deep 
distress. Unable to fund national 
development programmes and 
beleaguered by droughts and famines, 
the government racked up debts and 
reshuffled its alliances, repudiating 
the 1972 peace deal for the south 
and pushing the country towards 
war. Gulf countries had recycled their 
petrodollars into Sudan’s national 
development plans, hoping that 
Sudan’s fertile peripheries would 
provide food security for the Gulf 
and for Sudan. When oil prices rose, 
Sudan borrowed more money. As 
the 1970s financial crisis played out 
across the world, interest rates soared 
and international debt overwhelmed 
Sudan.41 
The 1983 laws were partly intended 
as a means of disciplining the 
desperate new arrivals from the war 
and drought zones of Darfur and the 
South, who were the main targets of 
theatrical amputations and floggings 
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the moneyed centre. Its austerity 
programmes were constructed 
around the fault-lines dividing the 
centre and the periphery. During the 
debt-financed development of the 
1970s, the government had invested 
in agricultural schemes across the 
periphery, and it also built up local 
government and local services there. 
These services and investments were 
largely financed by transfers from 
the central government to regional 
ones. The transfers did not survive 
the austerity measures of the 1990s. 
In 1994, the government divided 
Sudan’s nine regions into 26 states. 
The new federal system deepened the 
financial responsibility of the new 
states for social services. But the new 
states were given almost no financial 
resources to meet these obligations. 
Through the 1990s, that experience 
entrenched the country’s regional 
inequalities in health and education. 
At Sudan’s centre, welfare indicators 
went into retreat.44 In drought-
affected Darfur, the government 
polarized different social groups 
by rearranging administrative and 
ethnic boundaries, and young men 
drifted towards the new militias built 
around the ruling party or around 
polarized ethnic constituencies.45 In 
the south, austerity meant famine 
and constant displacement.46 
As well as changing patterns of 
inequality, neoliberal policies changed 
patterns of growth. Changing patterns 
of growth allowed the coalition of 
Islamists, businessmen and security 
men to manage the storms of its first 
turbulent decade in power. Economic 
adjustment was for them an 
opportunity: Sudan underwent two 
waves of privatization in the 1990s, 
and (as in many other economies) 
the benefits of privatization went 
mostly to politically well-connected 
groups.47 These groups had vested 
interests in the Islamic banks too, 
which provided easy money in return 
for political support. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, 
Sudan’s Islamic banks were primarily 
oriented towards building an Islamist 
political constituency. But their 
system was open to self-criticism 
and capable of self-correction and 
improvisation. In the late 1990s, the 
government realized that its banking 
system needed reforms in order to 
attract foreign direct investment 
and develop new industries such as 
oil, and it invited the IMF’s advice.48 
The government needed investment 
to construct thousands of kilometres 
of oil pipeline linking southern 
oilfields with its Red Sea ports. It 
also needed to finance its military 
operations in the south, where its 
war aims were oriented towards 
control of oilfields. It was remarkably 
successful in diversifying income 
sources.49 Its painful transformation 
of the economy played a role in 
the dramatic increase in foreign 
direct investment that occurred as 
development and warfare intensified 
around its southern oilfields, in the 
late 1990s (Figure 1). 
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back the debts that Nimeiri had run 
up in desperation. The Sudanese 
ambassador to Washington 
explained Sudan’s commitments to 
the IMF board in 1992, just as the 
organization was threatening its 
expulsion:
“The Government of Sudan has 
adopted a radical and far-reaching 
program of economic reforms 
aimed at freeing up the economy, 
bringing down inflation, and 
creating a climate conducive to the 
revitalization of the private sector. 
This has included the dismantling 
of all controls on prices, investment 
and trade; the elimination of 
virtually all budgetary subsidies 
– implicit and explicit; the lifting 
of most restrictions on external 
transactions; the adoption of a 
unified floating exchange rate; and 
the launching of a wide-ranging 
program of privatization.”43 
Sudan was one of very few 
African countries which adopted 
neoliberal policies of its own 
accord. Its experience of debt-
financed modernization followed 
by economic collapse and austerity 
was far from unique. But most 
African countries were pressured 
into taking these measures by 
the threat of cutting off access to 
international finance. 
The neoliberal order deepened 
inequality and made it more 
dislocating. Poor people migrated 
from the chaotic periphery to 
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not able to devise Islamic financial instruments that could allocate capital 
efficiently to agriculture in Sudan, and most of their non-performing loans 
were agricultural.55 
The economic restructuring of the 1990s contributed to the strong growth 
of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Patterns of growth shifted: 
a predominantly agricultural economy became a predominantly service 
economy, buoyed by oil. As before, sharīca was at the forefront of economic 
change, but it did not drive it. The main impetus for this change was economic 
restructuring prompted by huge debts. The Islamic banks helped this process 
by charting a path away from agricultural economy for a narrow, well connected 
group. Austerity was a vote against agricultural development, which required 
resolution of land and labour issues that were beyond the capabilities of the 
government. It was a vote in favour of an export-led, security state, which 
brought Sudan triumphant growth rates in the twenty-first century. Austerity, 
and the growth that succeeded it, raised questions about the distribution 
of wealth, which Islamic economics tried to answer. Islamic approaches 
to redistribution were mostly unsuccessful, and this led to the adoption of 
other approaches during the growth spurt of the first decade of the twenty-
first century. Before looking at the twenty-first century history of growth and 
redistribution, this paper briefly reviews the Islamic attempts to redistribute 
wealth through the zakāt system.
The zakāt system and changing patterns of inequality
The new Islamic banks identified and invested in the winners of the new 
system that emerged out of the global financial crisis. The losers were the 
ordinary Sudanese citizens who had to deal with debt and austerity. The 1990 
Zakāt Act outsourced their welfare to the semi-independent Zakāt Chamber. 
Thousands of unelected local zakāt committees, some of them linked to the 
Popular Committees (part of the government’s surveillance regime) organized 
the collection and distribution of zakāt.56 
The Zakāt Chamber allowed the government to devolve responsibility for social 
welfare to an institution that used resonantly Islamic language for welfare 
and vulnerability. It helped the Islamist movement to delegitimize traditional 
Islamic movements (such as the Mahdist movement) that were once the 
government’s ideological competitors – not least by diverting zakāt resources 
away from them. Zakāt could also be spent ‘for bringing hearts together 
for Islam’ (to target assistance at converts to Islam), a divisive approach to 
welfare and redistribution in a multi-faith country polarized around religion. 
In the displacement camps around Khartoum, displaced women from the 
predominantly non-Muslim south queued for food in Muslim headscarves.
Some of the writers cited here 
suggest that the economic changes of 
the 1990s were a story of patronage 
politics or corruption. Privatizations 
and financial reforms allowed 
the Islamists to create a political 
constituency out of the winners of a 
period of severe economic distress.51 
But the competitive neoliberal 
order is supposed to create winners, 
and neoliberal policies routinely 
rearrange the boundaries between 
the economic and political domains 
– the spaces where corruption 
happens. Blaming Islamic banks for 
corrupt practices, or the government 
for patronage politics, misses some 
important points about the way that 
neoliberalism works. 
Focusing on the links between 
Islamic banking and corruption 
also overlooks other changes that 
were taking place. The austerity 
economics of the 1980s and 1990s 
ended Sudan’s breadbasket strategy 
– the 1970s attempt to resolve the 
contradictions of its peripheries with 
a new, productive economy backed 
by state-directed social services. In 
the 1980s, Islamic banks were part 
of a process that directed investment 
away from agriculture and towards 
trade: up to 1991, advances to 
agriculture made up 1 percent of total 
advances.52 In the 1990s, the central 
bank pushed the Islamic banks 
towards investment in agriculture, 
but the banks saw these loans as 
risky and low-return.53 Sudanese 
agriculture is conventionally divided 
into three sectors: mechanized, 
irrigated and traditional, and most 
of the investment went towards 
mechanized farming, which was 
the sector most deeply engaged in 
reorganizing land and labour in the 
rainlands of the north-south border 
– processes which intensified the war 
in those areas.54 Islamic banks were 
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Figure 1: A dramatic increase in foreign direct investment50
Data from World Bank. Last updated Apr 27, 2017.
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
macroeconomic situation, drawing 
in foreign direct investment.59 
The government’s military 
determination – and divisions 
within the southern-based rebels 
of the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army/Movement (SPLA/M) – won 
them control of southern oilfields 
and their trade diplomacy won 
them East Asian markets for that 
oil. In the first decade of the twenty-
first century, growth rates almost 
matched the rates seen at the 
start of the national development 
strategies of the 1970s.60 
Sudan’s oil era (exports began 
in 1999) marked an end to the 
revolutionary fervour of the 
early 1990s, when Sudan’s new 
rulers abolished Khartoum’s 
cosmopolitan civil society 
and declared jihād against its 
peripheral population. By the end 
of the 1990s, the new economic 
possibilities presented by the oil 
industry prompted a new mood of 
pragmatism within the Islamist 
movement. The secret committees 
and revolutionary command 
councils which had implemented 
austerity were replaced by a 
constitution and a mass-based 
political party, the National 
Congress – led by the Islamists 
but open to former adversaries. 
The government moved to end its 
diplomatic isolation and to reach a 
peace deal with the southern rebels. 
The financial sector was reformed, 
and between 1996 and 2000 foreign 
direct investment made up about 
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But the Zakāt Chamber, alongside 
the Islamist NGOs which appeared 
at the time, also provided an Islamist 
version of international trends in 
social welfare, which were being 
transformed by neoliberalism. A key 
element of this transformation was to 
reframe entitlement to social services 
around notions of vulnerability, and 
away from the ideal of universal 
provision. This transformation is 
multi-dimensional: the process of 
means-testing, or separating the 
vulnerable from the not-vulnerable-
enough, requires deeper state 
penetration of daily life. Devolving 
assistance to a semi-official body with 
resources limited by its own revenue-
generation efforts rids the state of 
accountability for social welfare. 
These processes are happening across 
the world – in Sudan, they were 
facilitated and explained through 
the language of the Qur’an. In other 
societies, categories of vulnerability 
were demarcated by social scientists 
and bureaucrats, but in Sudan the 
spreadsheets in the annual reports of 
the Zakāt Chamber are based on a list 
in the Qur’an.
Zakāt expenditures are only for the 
poor and for the needy and for those 
employed to collect [zakāt] and for 
bringing hearts together [for Islam] and 
for freeing captives [or slaves] and for 
those in debt and for the cause of Allah 
and for the [stranded] traveller - an 
obligation [imposed] by Allah.57 
Neoliberal social welfare policies 
categorize vulnerability in order 
to limit welfare spending and to 
limit state responsibility for welfare 
spending. The Zakāt Chamber 
succeeded in these aims. Zakāt is 
levied on accumulated wealth, mostly 
at a rate of 2.5 percent (in Sudanese 
law, some wealth categories such as 
livestock are taxed at higher rates). 
But initially only salaried employees 
paid zakāt. In 1990, zakāt resources 
were 27.8 million Sudanese dinars 
– about US$ 12.5 million. A decade 
later, zakāt resources had increased 
to 13.5 billion Sudanese dinars, about 
US$ 51 million. Atta El Battahani’s 
surveys in 1992 and 1993 on the social 
impacts of economic liberalization 
found that the Zakāt Chamber gave 
monthly cash transfers to about 5,000 
families across the country.58 Rather 
than providing alternative Islamist 
approaches to the question of wealth 
distribution, the zakāt system helped 
the state to retreat from social 
welfare in the cash-strapped 1990s. 
In the following decade, an economic 
boom and a peace deal brought 
the questions of inequality and the 
sharing out of wealth to the fore. The 
zakāt system proved unequal to the 
task.
ENCLAVES OF DEVELOPMENT 
AND THE END OF AUSTERITY
In the 1990s, Sudanese Islamists 
turned out to be fluent interpreters 
of austerity politics and of the new 
globalized, financialized economic 
order that underpinned those 
politics. The austerity programme 
failed to address Sudan’s debt 
crisis, but it stabilized the country’s 
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10 percent of GDP.61 Repression at the centre was tempered and routinized. 
Peripheral jihāds intensified, but the jihāds had a new, pragmatic rationale 
and mode of operation. They were centred on the oilfields of the Upper Nile 
rather than the Islamization of the south: one mujahidin formation was called 
the ‘Oil Protectors Brigade.’62 In any case, the government’s military capability 
was now reliant on local, semi-private militias which were structured around 
the kinship systems of predominantly non-Muslim southern ethnic groups, 
and paid in bullets and loot. 
Oil and pragmatism helped to end one of Sudan’s longest-running wars, 
between the government and the SPLA/M. In 2005, the two parties signed 
a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which shared out oil revenues 
between the Khartoum government and an autonomous government in the 
South with its own army, and led to the secession of South Sudan in 2011. 
The transition to oil, the improvisation of new, hyper-violent means to 
extract the wealth of the periphery, and the pragmatic peace deal decisively 
reshaped patterns of growth and inequality. Sudan had been a low-income 
country throughout the twentieth century, but the oil boom – constructed out 
of mineral-extraction enclaves in the chaos zones of its periphery – turned it 
into a lower-middle income country. Industry and services grew in importance, 
and agriculture – which employed most of the population – was relegated (see 
Figure 2).
The changes to the composition 
of Sudan’s GDP reflected a 
transformation in the relationship 
between the centre and the periphery. 
In the 1970s, during a different 
international economic order, Sudan 
set up agricultural schemes along 
the populous borderlands between 
northern and southern Sudan, 
disrupting land and labour relations 
there. These schemes represented an 
attempt to bring modernization to 
the periphery, and draw it into global 
circuits of exchange. They ended in 
failure and famine, and by the 1990s, 
they became conflict zones. 
In the twenty-first century, the 
government reworked the geography 
of agricultural development. The 
cotton estates that financed most 
of Sudan’s twentieth century 
development were run down.64 
Peripheral agriculture received 
almost no investment. Instead, the 
government adopted an Agricultural 
Revival Programme in 2006, which 
aimed to configure agricultural 
development around spectacular new 
dams and capital-intensive farming 
along the northern Nile valley. The 
new farms were to be financed by 
Egyptian and Gulf capital, secured 
against leased land.65 
Sudan’s Agricultural Revival 
Programme was centred not on 
the periphery but on the cultural 
heartland of the state. The dams 
displaced populations in significant 
areas of the heartland and reorganized 
employment and opportunity even 
more widely. The Agricultural Revival 
Programme linked the heartland with 
new preoccupations of global capital: 
the financial and food-price crises 
of 2007-08 led many foreign nations 
and companies to purchase or lease 
millions of hectares of African land 
in order to secure food supplies 
back home. But the agricultural 
revival, centred on the dams, 
diverted investment from peripheral 
agriculture and has prolonged hunger 
in much of the country.66 
Perhaps agricultural revival was not a 
main aim of dam construction, which 
in many years accounted for as much 
as half of all national development 
expenditure.67 Dams helped Sudan to 
treble electricity generation over the 
decade to 2014.68 And many observers 
believe that a central function of 
the lavish secretive budget of the 
Dams Implementation Unit was 
to distribute political rents that 
could help the government weather 
the crises generated by the 2011 
secession of South Sudan.69 Dams may 
not have transformed agricultural 
productivity, but they accelerated 
the trend in economic momentum 
away from agriculture and towards 
services and foreign-financed 
industrial development. These trends 
were pioneered by the Islamic banks 
in the 1970s and 1980s – the banks 
have never extended much credit 
to agriculture, and almost none to 
agriculture in peripheral areas.70 
The neoliberal era ended modernist 
plans to rework the contradictions of 
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Figure 2: The composition of Sudan’s GDP, in percent of GDP at factor cost63 
Sources: Sudanese authorities and staff estimates
the periphery, and an acceptance that many of these contradictions would be 
worked out by violence rather than government planning or other means. But 
this acceptance did not amount to a withdrawal from the periphery. Instead, 
the government invested in mineral-extraction enclaves, secured in zones of 
armed conflict. The population was driven off the land by militias recruited 
from alienated sections of their ethnic communities. Oil installations were 
staffed by Asian migrants; and security men from the village birthplaces of oil 
ministers and security chiefs in the far north of Sudan. The mineral-extraction 
enclaves played a central role in the violent lucrative transformation of 
Sudan’s economic fortunes. 
James Ferguson, a US-based anthropologist, argues that Sudan provides an 
extremely violent example of an African trend towards developing territorial 
enclaves of development, secured by private militias. These ‘spatially 
segregated mineral-extractive enclaves,’ as Ferguson describes them, allows 
for the exploitation of peripheral wealth that allows Sudan to participate in 
the global competitive order – which, like any competitive order needs losers 
as much as it needs winners. Ferguson argues that the neoliberal techniques 
of austerity and privatization have reinstituted a system similar to the 
depredations of the first colonial era.71 
The southern oilfields provide one example of development configured 
around enclaves of mineral extraction. Darfur provides another. Insecurity 
in Darfur turned to armed conflict in 2003. When security forces failed 
to promptly put down the rebellion, they recruited militias from landless 
groups of camel pastoralists, and deployed them against the settled groups 
from which many of the leaders of the rebellion had come. The most capable 
rebel leaders were former members of the Islamist security forces, who felt 
that the oil-led economic growth at the centre had left the periphery behind. 
An initial surge of violence traumatically urbanized much of the settled 
agricultural population, and the whole region then lurched into a series of 
unsuccessful peace deals and local militia wars over natural resources. In 
2016, the government controversially declared an end to the conflict, citing 
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military gains and the conclusion of 
a referendum on the future of Darfur.
Key government militias were drawn 
from Arabic-speaking groups, and the 
rebels mobilized mainly from groups 
which spoke African languages as 
well as Arabic. Both sides resorted to 
a racialized language – Arabs versus 
Africans – that borrowed from the 
nineteenth-century slave trade in the 
south. Racialized simplifications were 
easier to digest than the complicated 
story of how a forty-year experiment 
in Islamist neoliberalism had 
repatterned growth and inequality, 
relegating Darfur in the process. 
Neoliberalism operated differently in 
the periphery. There was no financial 
revolution: Islamic banks lent out 
negligible amounts of money from 
the branches which they established 
there.72 Privatization worked 
differently too – instead of the state 
auctioning off public assets to the 
moneyed and well-connected, young 
men auctioned themselves to the 
commanders of private militias, and 
private militias auctioned themselves 
to governments, rebels and industrial 
concerns. Alex De Waal gives a vivid 
account of the political marketplace 
where Darfurian militia commanders 
bid for suitcases full of cash.73 Many 
militias on the opposition side have 
been pushed out of Darfur over the 
past few years by this government 
strategy, and some are fighting in 
Yemen, Libya, South Sudan, and 
on some of the other battlefields 
of Sudan instead. One militia, the 
Rapid Support Forces, has been 
incorporated into national security 
forces and is now responsible for 
managing the migration policy of 
the European Union, monitoring the 
borders with Libya to stop refugees 
from the Horn of Africa making their 
way to the Mediterranean shore.74 
Darfur’s traditional economy was 
upended. In the 1960s and 1980s, 
observers witnessed a transition 
away from household self-sufficiency 
and the deepening of market 
relations in Darfur.75 In the twenty-
first century, Darfur became heavily 
dependent on external markets. A 
2009 national household survey 
showed that Darfurian households 
purchased about 80 percent of their 
food. But Darfur’s grain markets were 
not supplied by Darfurian producers: 
Darfur was generally self-sufficient in 
grain before the conflict, but in 2014 
it produced less than half of the grain 
that its population needed.76 Nor 
did Darfurian grain markets satisfy: 
about one third of the population 
went hungry (the survey showed that 
nationally the hungry population 
was concentrated in poorer agrarian 
states, and the deepest hunger was 
around the oilfields of South Sudan).77 
New economies emerged to consume 
the productive energies of millions 
of traumatically urbanized farmers: 
charcoal collection and brick-
making, petty trade, humanitarian 
aid and militias.78 A gold rush in 2012 
illustrated the changes to systems of 
production and growth. In 2011, when 
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South Sudan seceded, Sudan lost three-quarters of its oil reserves and about 
40 percent of its export earnings. The government and its creditors looked to 
gold, and gold mining increased dramatically. In 2009, gold accounted for about 
4 percent of export earnings: in 2012, it accounted for 53 percent (production 
went up from 14 to 44 tons).79 In 2014, the Sudanese authorities estimated 
that about one million workers (about 11 percent of the total workforce) 
were working in gold mining.80 In mining areas of Eastern Sudan, the gold 
rush emptied whole villages of men, and the defence minister complained in 
parliament that gold rushes were undermining army recruitment.81 
When Darfur’s gold rush began in early 2012, its dislocated workforce 
responded with alacrity. Militias displaced an estimated 150,000 people from 
the gold mines at Jebel Amir in North Darfur, and began a violent contest 
for control of the mines which took the lives of hundreds of people. The 
militia organized themselves and their workforce around ethnicity, but their 
predations on workers pushed many miners to new gold rushes in Chad.82 
Darfur’s privately-secured enclaves of mineral extraction were quickly set up 
and manned. It was as if an entire population had been primed to respond to 
the market pressures transmitted by the Khartoum government and the IMF. 
According to Ferguson, Sudan’s privately-secured mineral extraction enclaves 
illustrate a wider set of changes that were ushered in during the neoliberal era. 
Before that era, national development strategies tried to integrate peripheral 
societies and resources into global circuits of economic activity. Now, those 
peripheral societies are seen as ‘unusable’ in Ferguson’s terminology (echoing 
the French colonial doctrine of l’Afrique utile and l’Afrique inutile). As he 
says, ‘capital “hops” over “unusable” Africa,” alighting only in mineral-rich 
enclaves that are starkly disconnected from national societies.’83 In the global 
competitive order, these societies are useless. This combination of rapid 
growth and chaotic uselessness, says Ferguson elsewhere, throws up the 
question of redistribution.
Enclaves of development and the question of redistribution
Ferguson studied the way in which neoliberalism throws up the question 
of distribution in South Africa. He describes how youth unemployment and 
male youth imprisonment have cut off vast sections of the South African 
youth population from participation in a globalized system of production. 
But he sees a hopeful aftermath for the weak, fierce neoliberal state that has 
thwarted the productivity of marginal zones and populations in the name of 
competition and growth. His hopes arose from his studies of a South African 
Basic Income Grant campaign, which calls for a modest monthly payment to 
all citizens, regardless of income. One of the campaign’s assumptions is that 
formal employment for all or for most 
is no longer an attainable objective 
in Africa. South Africa had a well-
developed welfare system for white 
people, which was deracialized in 
1994 and expanded rapidly as South 
Africa’s neoliberal restructuring 
informalized labour and created 
unemployment. Ferguson argues that 
with formal labour disappearing in 
the new South Africa, the able, wage-
earning male began to disappear, 
and more and more people became 
eligible for welfare.84 
How did Sudan address the question 
of redistribution of wealth? Zakāt was 
the Islamist policy mechanism for 
direct redistribution of wealth, and to 
help poor families deal with the loss 
of access to free education and health 
services. In 2012, the Zakāt Chamber’s 
annual report stated that total zakāt 
spending amounted to 718.9 million 
Sudanese pounds (about US$126 
million). Seventy percent of this 
figure went to the poor and the needy 
in cash transfers and projects.85 These 
families were identified by a 2011 
poverty census and targeted by local 
zakāt committees. According to a 
2014 study by the World Bank, cash 
transfers amounted to about US$ 2.60 
per household per month. In 2012, 
almost 3 million families received 
zakāt transfers.86 
Zakāt cash transfers made up about 
0.3 percent of GDP in 2012. Although 
it addresses the questions of 
redistribution thrown up by Sudan’s 
growth models, the monthly dole 
provides very low sums to families, 
and because zakāt is collected and 
distributed locally, sums may be lower 
in poorer states.87 Since 2012, Darfur, 
with about 20 percent of Sudan’s 
population, received between 10 and 
14 percent of zakāt expenditure.
Zakāt may have been useful for 
reworking notions of entitlement and 
vulnerability during the austerity era 
of the 1990s, but it appears unequal 
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Figure 3: Zakāt collection and expenditure.88 
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These huge transfers were not 
enough to keep South Sudan and 
Sudan together, or to provide a lasting 
solution in Darfur. Pouring financial 
resources from the centre into the 
periphery has not yet addressed 
inequality, and does not take into 
account the way that growth has 
been repatterned around enclaves 
of mineral extraction in a chaotic 
periphery, and a glittering centre 
networked to international trade and 
finance.
CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that sharīca 
law has been at the forefront of 
externally-driven economic change 
in Sudan since pre-colonial times. 
Over the past forty years, Sudan’s 
Islamist government used versions 
of sharīca law regulating commerce 
and social welfare to frame deeper 
economic changes in the country. 
The consequences have been wide-
ranging. New Islamic banks attracted 
capital to the country when it was 
starved of cash. It loans policy was 
used as a patronage system, and it 
created an economic constituency 
for the Islamist movement. New 
Islamic approaches to social welfare, 
based on zakāt alms taxes, helped 
redefine notions of entitlement 
and vulnerability and erode 
expectations of universal provision. 
The authoritarian possibilities of 
religious law helped the government 
force through reforms that would 
be unlikely to attract democratic 
support. Jihād discourse was part 
of a strategy to develop extractive 
enclaves in a periphery that lost out 
from the competitive order created 
by neoliberalism. Aided by economic 
circumstance, the government 
transformed the patterns of growth 
and inequality in Sudan. 
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Figure 4: Wages as a proportion of state-level expenditure in North Darfur 
 before and after the signing of the CPA.93 
to the task of addressing the problem of redistribution thrown up by Sudan’s 
current growth model. However, the Sudanese government adopted other 
approaches to dealing with the problem of redistribution during the decade 
from 2000 when Sudan witnessed sustained growth: huge transfers from the 
central government to state (provincial) governments. 
Both the government and the SPLM believed that Sudan’s inequality was 
configured around the centre-periphery fault-lines that were created in the 
nineteenth century and deepened in the twentieth century by colonialism and 
then austerity. The SPLM – and the Darfur rebels after them – had mobilized 
resistance around this centre-periphery conundrum. They saw regional 
inequality as a root cause of war: the CPA began by declaring that its signatories 
were ‘SENSITIVE to historical injustices and inequalities in development 
between the different regions of the Sudan that need to be redressed.’89 
The government’s adversaries now demanded a share of the oil wealth that 
was piped out of the periphery and spent on infrastructural development in 
the north, as well as gated communities and glittering imitations of the Dubai 
style in the capital. The CPA’s main response to inequality was to recycle 
economic success back into the periphery through a radical new policy on 
transfers to the states. After 2005, as much as 40 percent of the government 
budget was transferred to regional governments in the north and the 
south.90 The CPA’s fiscal arrangements were extremely influential: they were 
incorporated into the constitution and every subsequent Sudanese peace deal, 
and they outlasted the 2011 secession of South Sudan.91 
In the 1970s, central government transfers to peripheral regions were linked 
to other measures that aimed to transform the periphery, but after 2005 
fiscal measures were disconnected from peripheral development planning: 
peripheral development was restricted to a few enclaves of mineral extraction. 
The huge transfers from central government to the states were spent on new 
wage bills – and in poorer, peripheral states, where there was no development 
investment, the wage-bill made up about 60 percent of all transfers to states. 
In Darfur and South Sudan, states spent almost exclusively on wages (Figure 
4).92 These wages went to teachers and nurses who had not been properly paid 
for a decade. But they also created a government salariat in polarized and 
impoverished provincial and district towns. This salariat works as a social 
protection system in a war zone, and it may even offer a sense of possibility 
or even aspiration to wider groups living out complicated social and economic 
lives in an insecure periphery. But it also works as a patronage network: the 
wages go to a relatively small number of families, and their political loyalties 
are often key to getting a wage-paying job. 
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